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NAFTA CHAPTER 11:

ARE THE DISPUTE

RESOLUTION PROCEDURES WORTH

THE INVESTMENT?
Natalie Sears*

I.

CHAPTER ELEVEN OF NAFTA

N 1994, the negotiations between Mexico, Canada, and the United
States ended as the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) came into effect.1 NAFTA, in its act of eliminating most
barriers to trade and investment between Mexico, Canada, and the
United States, sought to encourage foreign investment by stabilizing economic activity among the three countries. 2 One way NAFTA sought to
accomplish such a goal was through its Chapter Eleven provisions, providing rights and protections to investors looking to extend their invest3
ment activities into one of the three foreign countries.
Chapter Eleven of NAFTA allows corporations and investors to bring
state-investor claims in confidential arbitration tribunals if they believe a
country's government issued a conflicting regulation or decision that negatively impacts their investment in that particular country. 4 This particular chapter was designed to protect foreign investment transactions while
5
providing for efficient resolution to investment-related disputes.
Historically, arbitration was favored by industrialized nations and disfavored by developing ones, who usually find themselves coerced and
pressured into accepting arbitration as the sole means for resolving disputes. 6 In fact, during initial negotiations for NAFFA, Canada was seeking the more independent dispute resolution body integrated into the
Canada United States Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA). 7 But as we see
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1. North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFrANow.Oic;, http://www.naftanow
.org/about/default-en.asp (last visited June 8, 2014).
2. Id.
3. NAFTA Chapter 11: Corporate Cases, Pun. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/Page
.aspx?pid=1218 (last visited June 8, 2014).
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4. Id.
5. NAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations, U.S. DEI'ARITMENT OF STATE, www.state.gov/
s/l/c3439.htm (last visited June 8, 2014).
6. Jennifer A. Heindl, Toward a History of NAFTA's Chapter Eleven, 24 BE ISK1,1AY
J. IN'r'i. LAW. 672, 673 (2006), available at http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/
vol24/iss2/1 1.
7. Id.

LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 20

474

the chapter in practice today, Canadian officials believe that Chapter
Eleven provisions have been applied even more broadly than they
8
intended.
Chapter Eleven covers all disputes arising between investors of other
countries, including claims such as expropriation, discrimination, and unfair treatment. 9 Originally, arbitration was thought of as a forum that
could settle international disputes in a neutral way, reducing the so-called
"home-court" advantage. 10 Particularly in the business realm, companies
and investors alike are weary towards litigation, where procedural and
substantive unfairness can play a huge part in a case's outcome. Within
Chapter Eleven of NAF1TA, arbitration was specifically selected for investments because foreign investors fear having to resolve disputes in a
court that might be predisposed to ruling for the other side every time,
thereby inhibiting their decision to send their investment money internaIn creating a mandatory arbitration procedure, NAFTA
tionally."
sought to encourage investors to cross borders and invest in activity with12
out adding fear to the already high cost of investing there.
Within Chapter Eleven, investors may choose between three arbitration methods: ICSID Convention, Additional Facility Rules of ICSID,
and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 13 In normal practice, because of the
underlying policy in favor of fairness, the two disputing parties will normally hold the arbitration in the third NAFTA country not involved in
the dispute in order to create an additional neutrality safeguard. 1 4 If a
foreign investor initiates an investor-state case, the claim will be brought
to a binding arbitration process of the World Bank and the United Na15
tions, which are "closed to public participation, observation and input."'
II.

MODERN CRITICISM OF THE AGE-OLD
PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION

Although arbitration has been a method used for centuries, many
scholars claim that investor arbitration for claims arising out of Chapter
Eleven do not work as well in practice as the drafters of NAFIfA initially
hoped they would. One criticism is that the investment arbitration provided for under Chapter Eleven is evidence of a possible double standard
by the United States.1 6 Similar to the way Canada initially predicted
Chapter Eleven would be applied more narrowly, the United States, as
well, believed the investment arbitration provisions would be used a dif8.

Ray C. Jones, NAFTA Chapter II Investor-to-State Dispute Resolution:A Shield to
Be Embraced or a Sword to be Feared?, 2002 B.Y.U. L. REv. 527 (2002).
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(2d ed. 2012).
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ferent way than has played out. 1 7 Some legal scholars note that the
United States looks highly upon investment arbitration when it corrects
misbehavior by foreign states, but it is not favored when used to attack its
8
own country's governmental decision-making.'
Broader criticisms include concerns about the confidentiality and overall secrecy of the arbitration process and uncertainty in their outcomes
and decisions. Others question the absence of accountability of domestic
constituents. 19 This concern is particularly noteworthy and troublesome
because it was one of the primary reasons for implementing arbitration,
rather than permitting litigation, in Chapter Eleven of NAFTA.20 It is
also commonly tied to a violation found in section A of Chapter Eleven,
which prohibits discrimination against foreign investors and requires "fair
and equitable" treatment.2 ' In addition, some claim that the cases
brought to arbitral tribunals under Chapter Eleven constitute a "regulatory taking," rather than issues of Mexico seizing property from U.S. and
Canadian companies, which was the originally anticipated scenario
22
sought to be prevented by Chapter Eleven.
Other opponents claim that Chapter Eleven acts as a "sword" for investors, allowing them to attack the NAFTA countries, rather than the
"shield" it was intended to be.2 3 This occurs because investors citing
Chapter Eleven claims can use their leverage of such arbitration to sway
governmental agencies into certain law-making decisions. 2 4 In addition,
because Chapter Eleven requires full evaluation of each case on the merits, whether seemingly frivolous or not, governments recognize the cost
and time burdens such arbitration will take if they pass certain litigation,
and could thus likely be persuaded to act in accordance with the demands
25
of foreign investors.
III.

INVESTOR-TO-STATE CLAIMS IN RECENT YEARS

Although Chapter Eleven was designed so as to minimize the number

of investor-to-state disputes and increase their outcomes' predictability,
the arbitration provision in and of itself has proven troublesome for
many. Many of the cases heard through arbitration within recent years
under Chapter Eleven involve disputes caused by the ambiguous language contained in the provision and others involve struggles of power

between a foreign investor and a country's government.
Article 1105(1) of NAFTA requires each country to "accord investments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with interna17. Id.

18. Id.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 705.
See id. at 704.
Id. at 706.
Jones, supra note 8, at 541.
Id. at 541-42.
Id. at 543.
Id.
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tional law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and
security. ''26 These terms represent some of those most in dispute between investors and countries, especially the meaning of "international
law" and "full protection and security. '27 The latter term has been interpreted to hold a nation liable for failure to use due diligence when trying
to prevent third parties from injuring foreign investors covered under
NAFTA. 28 In some cases, even where governmental actions have been
found to be non-discriminatory in nature, 29arbitration decisions have still
found a breach of this NAFTA provision.
In the past, many arbitration decisions have portrayed how closely foreign investors scrutinize governmental, and very often environmental, action, and expect remedial action to be taken to maintain and protect their
investments abroad. For example, in Methanex Corp. v. U.S.A., a California governor banned gasoline with an additive called "MTBE" because of
30
concerns that it would penetrate into the state's drinking water supply.
What is noteworthy about this case is that the claimant, Methanex, is a
Canadian corporation producing feedstock, not the actual MTBE. 3' But
it still filed an investor-to-state claim arguing expropriation, discrimination, and denial of the minimum standard of treatment. 32 This claim incited environmental protests based on accusations that NAFTA Chapter
over the local governmental auEleven favored foreign investors' profits
33
thority to regulate its own sovereign.
Many disputes arise because of the power struggle and threat of arbitration proceedings brought by investors under Chapter Eleven claims.
One of the most illustrative cases of this particular issue is Ethyl v. Ca34
nada, which occurred only a matter of years after NAFTA was signed.
Ethyl Corporation is a chemical company based in Virginia and a very
35
large methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl (MMT) producer.
Ethyl Corporation exported this chemical to its subsidiary in Canada,
Ethyl Canada, who then sold it to refineries until April 1997 when the
Canadian Parliament imposed a ban on MMT's importation into Canada. 36 Even before the Canadian Parliament passed the law, Ethyl Corporation threatened a Chapter Eleven suit, claiming the ban would
amount to expropriation. 37 Ethyl Corporation's position stated that they
were entitled to due compensation for losing the right to export to the
26. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289, art. 1105(1) (1993), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/chap-11

.asp.
27. Park, supra note 6 at 709.
28.

Id.

29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id. at 711.
Id. at 711-12.
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corporation's Canadian subsidiary. 38 The Canadian Parliament followed
through with the law and Ethyl followed through with its threat, and subsequently filed a Chapter Eleven suit seeking $251 million. 39 Even
though Ethyl Corporation did not follow the timing procedure laid out in
article 1120.72, the tribunal allowed the suit. But before it came to fruition, Canada rescinded its law, allowing Ethyl to continue exporting into
40
Canada.
Ethyl's argument was that Canada violated article 1102, requiring national treatment for foreign investors, because Canada's law banned the
import of MMT. But it did not interfere or object to the production of
MMT within its own country. 4 1 Ethyl also claimed Canada committed
"expropriation" by their actions to ban importation of MMT. 42 This term
has also been disputed among arbitration proceedings because it is not
defined within Chapter Eleven. 43 This concept is similar to that of eminent domain in the United States and means that a country may take
measures, such as banning MMT importation, only if the measures are
not discriminatory. 44 Even when carried out in a fair way, a country must
compensate their investors for any loss suffered because of the new regulation.4 5 What amounts to expropriation can be an entirely separate issue. Chapter Eleven claimants, not surprisingly, utilize the most
expansive definition under article 1110 to hold that any "measure" used
46
by the country can amount to such expropriation.
IV.

DOES CHAPTER ELEVEN NEED REVISING?

Legal scholars are divided on the question of whether Chapter Eleven,
which was deemed a very important and fairly groundbreaking section in
NAFIA, has proven successful, or whether it has become a nuisance of
power struggles. Certainly, the results are not what the countries originally anticipated. Upon signing in 1992, Canada and the United States
expected to be the investor-claimants filing Chapter Eleven suits, but
most often have found themselves placed in the respondent chair to Mex47
ico's lawsuits.
The result most concerning since NAFTA was signed twelve years ago
is the idea that expensive litigation might deter legitimate governmental
regulation that could potentially be in conflict, financially and politically,
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 539.
Id. at 538.
Id. at 538-39.
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21, 22 (2005), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAVFAReport-Final
.pdf.
42. Id. at 22.
43. Jones, supra note 8 at 550.

44. Id. at 551.

45. Id. at 550-51.
46. Id.
47. PARK, supra, note 9 at 724.
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with foreign investors' activity. 48 Especially in the case of a situation similar to Ethyl v. Canada, if a company like Ethyl can manage to change the
Canadian government's decision to ban a particular substance's importa49
Outtion, their country's policy-making ability is greatly hindered.
comes such as this will also have a ripple effect when other foreign
investors watch and see how much influence and power they can have
over a governmental body simply because of fear of Chapter Eleven
claims. 50 It has been noted that arbitration under NAFTA is thought of
as "investor-biased" and has only catapulted the number of investor-state
51
claims and disputes filed under Chapter Eleven in the past twenty years.
So, if Chapter Eleven is full of problems, what could be a solution?
Certainly, one possibility will be to revise the language, providing more
specificity to the investment arbitration language. But this may be hard
to accomplish because many arbitrators actually lobby to prevent reform
in the wording of investment protection clauses. 52 Vague language, however, has been recognized as an invitation to litigation and disputes. The
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development has stated "an
expansive interpretation of minimalist treaty language can give rise to a
lack of predictability in the application of the standard. This, in turn, may
lead to the undermining of legitimate State intervention for economic,
social, environmental and other developmental ends. ' 53 Another option
is to create a preliminary evaluation or screening tool to weed out frivolous and meritless claims. 54 This option might be particularly successful
because article 1121 removes the local remedies rule; thus, any obstacle
investors have to go through it in order to submit a Chapter Eleven
claim-regardless if the claim is meritless.5 5 This option could also help
reduce the number of Chapter Eleven claims, and as a result, governments would not have to be so cautious in their law-making abilities.
Although many have argued that NAFFA Chapter Eleven needs to
undergo several changes to make it as beneficial as the United States,
Canada, and Mexico originally intended it to be, others argue that the
arbitration provision is good just the way it is. 56 While critics claim the
chapter's procedures can deprive U.S. citizens of certain procedural rights
guaranteed to them under the Constitution, proponents of the provision
argue that it has served its purpose in achieving the goals found in article
48.
49.
50.
51.

52.
53.
54.
55.

56.

Jones, supra note 8 at 545.
Id. at 543.
See id.
Cecilia Olivet & Pia Eberhardt, Arbitrators' Role in the Recent Investment Arbitration Boom, INVFSTMENT. TIiFATY Ni~ws (March 25, 2013), http://www.iisd.org/itn/
201 3/03/251arbitrators-role-in-the-recent-investment-arbitration-boom/.
See id.
Id.
Jones, supra note 8 at 546.
See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289, art. 1121 (1993), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/chap112.asp.
Jones, supra note 8, at 542.
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102 and the preamble of the NAFITA Agreement. 5 7
V.

CONCLUSION

Although this year marks the twenty-year anniversary of NAFTA's implementation, the path has not gone unscathed. With regards to Chapter
Eleven, the provision that allows for investment arbitration over foreign
disputes, scholars remain divided as to whether it has been successful, will
be successful, or whether it needs to be changed in order to get on the
right path. The most obvious choice for reconstructing Chapter Eleven
would be to add specificity to the language so as to reduce frivolous investor-state claims with the hopes that such action would resolve the bigpicture issue.
Throughout the past twenty years, the most troublesome cases have
been those that challenge governmental decision-making even before the
decision has been made. Investors are using Chapter Eleven as a way to
entice governments to act in certain ways, which was never the purpose of
Chapter Eleven. In order to end the power struggles occurring between
wealthy investors and governments after Chapter Eleven threats have
been made, Chapter Eleven must allow for some type of screening device
so as to weed out meritless claims. Under NAFITA, governments are allowed to exercise their power reasonably, even if it interferes with foreign
investment activity. But under the current regime, a government may
still be taken to arbitration under a Chapter Eleven claim because
NAFTA requires full hearing on all claims-whether frivolous or not.
NAFTA needs a provision to filter out such claims so that governments
won't be threatened and dragged into each and every claim an investor
makes. It is the only way for governments to assert their power over their
sovereign and to ensure that investors don't interfere with such decisions.

57. Id. at 546.
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